International Trade
Tariffs Roundup
My colleagues published an excellent eUpdate on a number of trade developments this week. It's been a lot, with USTR coming out with a slate of new 301 Tariffs following its investigation into forced labor related policies and practices, opening a new 301 investigation on intellectual property protection in Vietnam, adjustments to 232 duties and more. Here is a link to the eUpdate. Also, here is a link to an X post from USTR with Jamieson Greer speaking to unfair trade practices in defense of the new tariffs. Coming out of all this, and an opportunity importers from China should seriously consider, is the chance to comment on "non-sensitive" goods that could be subject to tariff modifications. Here is an excerpt from the eUpdate: On June 2, 2026, USTR solicited public comments on a new Board of Trade that is intended to manage the U.S.-China bilateral trade relations, which the Trump Administration previewed after the meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi in May 2026. USTR seeks comments on non-sensitive goods that could be subject to tariff modifications on each side. The comments window closes on July 10, 2026, and any rebuttals or responses could be submitted by July 27, 2026. A link to this announcement can be found here.
June 4, 2026
by Troy M. Keller, Dave Townsend, T. Augustine Lo, and Justin T. Huff
International Trade
Using AI to Analyze 600+ Tariff Comment Letters
Like many, I've found myself experimenting with AI to see if it would enable me to take on projects that are otherwise out of reach. I've had success in some narrow cases, but other times I've ended up in a rabbit hole to nowhere. My most recent project has landed somewhere in the middle. When USTR opened two Section 301 tariff comment dockets in March, I had aspirations of creating an AI-powered process that would allow me to effectively harvest insights and trends from the large amount of commentary that was sure to follow. I imagined how useful it would be to create a database using automated tools and then slice and dice the information to provide new perspectives. Now, after a few weeks of iterating, I've got a tool that provides much of that functionality though with some drawbacks. You can see it for yourself here. Background on 301 Tariff Dockets As we discussed in an earlier blog post, USTR initiated a suite of 301 investigations on March 11, 2026 and then again on March 12 into the trade practices of sixty foreign economies. The investigations were a necessary procedural step for the USTR prior to determining whether new schedules of 301 tariffs can be applied in those jurisdictions. While the prospect of renewed or even potentially increased tariffs was an unwelcome development for many, the ability to comment in the investigations was an opportunity many organizations seized. In the end, hundreds of comment letters were filed by the deadline of mid-April. After hearings in early May, USTR extended the comment period to allow for post-hearing submissions; that window closes later this week. My Process For this exercise, I downloaded 633 comment letter pdfs that had been filed at the time the dockets originally closed in mid-April. I have not included letters filed since they re-opened, nor have I included data from the transcripts of hearings earlier this month. Those may come in a phase 2. To keep the dataset manageable and to focus on the more substantive comments, I also did not include comments that were not accompanied with a filed letter. This information was then aggregated in a datasheet and displayed on the dynamic dashboard linked to above. The dashboard includes summary information that can be filtered by industry, type of commentator, type of relief requested, targeted country and other factors. Each comment summary links to a stored copy of the commentator's pdf letter. AI Tools I Used The first step was to download 633 letters into a folder. I relied on an openclaw bot to manually download them one at a time (as they weren't available for bulk download on the Federal Register). As usual, getting the bot permissioned was most of the battle. A couple of times, I thought the process was moving along only to discover later that it had basically hallucinated most of the letters (which was impressive in itself, as these were real-looking pdfs from known companies--they just hadn't actually filed letters). I also relied on the openclaw bot to make updates to a database in Google Sheets where I stored extracted information from the letters. The bot's ability to write to the database so that I didn't have to continually cut and paste corrections from various chats was where it shone. While the bot was useful for moving files around and editing the database, I used Gemini and Claude for the thinking and analysis. They were more accurate and less likely to generalize or hallucinate. Still, because of the number of letters, these tools had to be prompted in small batches to read and pull summary data from them. More than 20 letters at a time would result in them hitting limits and either stopping mid-analysis or returning extrapolations that were useless. Running the prompts over and over was one thing, but re-explaining the whole project every time they lost context due to compaction was painful. I also used Claude to develop the dynamic dashboard to display the results and allow users to filter and sort them. The dashboard was published using Google Sites. Limitations and Caveats Every step involved accuracy challenges and more effort than I would want to repeat to catch them. At this moment, bugs still remain, mostly in the categorizations. As a result, the data is good enough for spotting trends, but probably not good enough for citation. Other limitations are by design. The categories we ended up with for industry sectors we more or less evolved into while trying to organize the letters into manageable groupings. In hindsight, a better route probably would have been to apply NAICS codes from the outset--though that might have led to dozens of single-entry categories, which I was hoping to avoid. Some Findings The main value from this exercise is the ability to go to the dashboard and filter results in a variety of ways to see what types of groups are commenting and what they are asking for. To give you a flavor, here are a few observations for each filter. Comment Letter Asks. No surprise, a significant number of the letters (261) sought tariff exclusions as their primary request to enable them as importers to better compete. However, there were more letters than I would have guessed going the other direction—114 in total. Generally, these were organizations pushing for tariffs that would be beneficial to their U.S. operations. A number of commentators used the opportunity to highlight non-tariff trade barriers or other trade affecting dynamics. We categorized most of these asks as "nuanced" given they covered concerns that did not fit cleanly into the for-or-against tariff framing. Who Filed. Individual corporations filed the bulk (305) of the submissions, followed by trade associations (200). NGOs and think tanks accounted for 60. Submissions also came from foreign governmental entities (11) and labor unions (7), with 50 falling into an "other" bucket. Targeted Countries. In terms of countries that were the subject of the comment letters, China came up the most (in 235 letters). Outside of China, the EU and India were the only economies to feature in over 100 letters. Mexico (80), Vietnam (73), Japan (48) and Taiwan (45) round out the rest of most-mentioned jurisdictions. Most Represented Industries. As expected, heavy manufacturing interests (industrial equipment, automotive, chemicals) represent the bulk of the comment letters. However, other sectors were also quite active. Our transportation/logistics category included 35 letters, and semiconductors and electronics category involved 24 letters. We counted 23 medical and pharmaceuticals related letters and 21 for textiles & apparel. Interestingly, 13 letters landed in our arts & antiques category, 15 in dairy & cheese and 12 in bicycles, motorcycles & e-bikes. These are high numbers for niche areas and demonstrate more sophisticated supply chain dynamics than might be expected. Parting Thoughts Overall, I'm pleased with the results and the capability of the dynamic dashboard. The lack of full confidence in the accuracy is not a small drawback. However, it's not so large a database that flaws are hidden, which means there is still good utility for those who are a little forgiving when they notice some mis-categorizations.
May 19, 2026
by Troy M. Keller
International Trade
Massive New Section 301 Investigations Present Opportunity for Comment
In the wake of the Supreme Court's February 20 decision striking down the authority of the United States Trade Representative to impose tariffs under IEEPA, USTR has been exploring other tariff authorities, including an immediate use of Section 122. It is now turning to its more traditional, investigative authorities, though to an unprecedented degree. On March 11, 2026 and then again on March 12, the USTR initiated a suite of Section 301 investigations into the trade practices of sixty economies. The investigations constitute a necessary procedural step for the USTR prior to determining whether new schedules of 301 tariffs can be applied in those jurisdictions. The March 11 announcement relates to sixteen major economies. Asia: China, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, India, Bangladesh. Europe: European Union, Switzerland, Norway. North America: Mexico. The investigations of these jurisdictions are broad and relate to "structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors." The March 11 press release further explains: "The investigations will determine whether those acts, policies, and practices are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce." The investigations announced on March 12 cover those sixteen, plus 44 additional jurisdictions and appear to have a narrower scope. They are to "determine whether acts, policies, and practices of each of these economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a ban on the importation of goods produced with forced labor are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce." While the prospect of renewed or even potentially increased tariffs is an unwelcome development for many companies, the ability to comment in the investigations should be recognized as an opportunity. For instance, companies can demonstrate how specific imports are essential to U.S. competitiveness or that no viable domestic alternative exists. Providing data-backed arguments now can prevent specific products needed for a company's supply chain from being swept into the initial tariff schedules. The USTR also tends to use these comments as leverage in bilateral negotiations. As such, companies should consider whether it could be beneficial to highlight the specific challenges or "structural" imbalances they may face in a particular jurisdiction. This gives the USTR the background it may need to address these issues through diplomatic or regulatory channels. Commenting as industry groups or coalitions of companies can be particularly effective. Finally, we note that companies may worry about risks of retaliation in foreign jurisdictions as a result of issues they raise in their comments. They are often right to do so. However, the USTR comment process does allow for particularly sensitive portions of comment letters to be submitted confidentially, and this option, while not perfect, can be utilized effectively. Here are the key dates for the comment process: Comment Docket Opens: March 17, 2026 Submission Deadline: April 15, 2026 Public Hearings Begin: April 28, 2026 (for the investigations regarding forced labor) and May 5, 2026 (for the investigations relating to excess production)
March 12, 2026
by Troy M. Keller, Dave Townsend, and T. Augustine Lo
International Trade
Are New Tariffs on Solid Legal Footing Under Section 122?
President Trump is imposing new tariffs effective on Tuesday, February 24, under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 122”). The Section 122 tariffs replace the tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), and that the Supreme Court on Friday found unlawful. Does a solid legal footing exist for the Section 122 tariffs? Given the amount of money at issue for U.S. businesses, it is not hard to imagine a new wave of litigation attacking Section 122, and again seeking refunds of Section 122 duties collected. Section 122 is a blank slate. President Trump is the first president to impose tariffs under Section 122, and indeed the first president to take any action under Section 122 according to the Congressional Research Service.[1] No court opinions thus exist that have examined executive action under Section 122. As discussed below, however, the court opinions relating to the IEEPA tariffs indicate that trade deficits are a valid basis for temporary tariffs under Section 122. Whether Section 122 will survive closer scrutiny is, ultimately, impossible to predict given the lack of any precedent or past practice as to Section 122’s scope. Basis for New Section 122 Tariffs. The new Section 122 tariffs and the prior IEEPA tariffs identified longstanding, persistent, and large trade deficits as justifying action. In particular, President Trump issued an executive order under IEEPA to address the longstanding U.S. trade deficit, and to authorize the global reciprocal tariffs.[2] Section 122 allows the imposition of tariffs “to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payment deficits” or to “prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets.”[3] In issuing his proclamation on Friday evening imposing Section 122 tariffs, President Trump cited the longstanding and persistent deficit as justifying the action. Thus, “[r]estricting imports through the surcharge imposed in this proclamation is required to address the fundamental international payments problems within the meaning of section 122 that I have found to exist.”[4] Section 122 Discussion in IEEPA Litigation. In the IEEPA litigation, the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) relied heavily on Section 122 to find that the IEEPA tariffs were unlawful. The CIT found that Section 122 “removes the President’s power to impose remedies in response to balance-of-payments deficits, and specifically trade deficits” from IEEPA’s scope of authority.[5] Section 122 is a “non-emergency statute with greater limitations”[6] compared to IEEPA. The CIT, accordingly, said that Section 122 effectively displaced any tariff authority that might be read into IEEPA, at least with respect to trade imbalances. “Trade deficits…can be directly impacted by mechanisms such as import quotas and tariffs, as authorized by Section 122.”[7] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) affirmed the CIT judgment, and also used Section 122 as context for interpreting IEEPA. The CAFC majority opinions cited Section 122 for the proposition that Congress delineated tariff authority carefully, and subject to procedural and durational limits.[8] The majority opinions of the Supreme Court said nothing particular about Section 122, except to say that numerous U.S. trade statutes place limits on the duration, amount, and scope of tariffs.[9] While the Supreme Court majority opinions did not discuss Section 122 in depth, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent did. He cited Section 122, along with other statutes, as providing “expansive” power to the President to impose tariffs.[10] Justice Kavanaugh also cited Section 122 to diminish the importance of the Supreme Court’s IEEPA decision: “with respect to tariffs in particular, the Court’s decision might not prevent Presidents from imposing most if not all of these same sorts of tariffs under other statutory authorities.”[11] Thus, from Justice Kavanaugh’s perspective, Section 122’s broad authority created an alternative to IEEPA that could be used to implement global tariffs. Whether Section 122 is Vulnerable to Lawsuit. All of the above is to say that IEEPA litigation suggests Section 122 is a basis to impose global tariffs to remedy trade deficits.[12] Not a lot more can be said than this, as of today. Any reviewing court of Section 122 tariffs would have to confront a dearth of authority on Section 122. There is no existing Section 122 practice, nor are there any cases directly reviewing executive action under Section 122. A reviewing court presumably would have to afford the President at least some discretion in determining the circumstances under which Section 122 is appropriately used. President Trump’s Section 122 proclamation cites to findings of the executive branch as to the scope, severity, and impact of trade deficits. It is unlikely that a reviewing court would meaningfully subject those findings to judicial review. President Trump’s Section 122 proclamation exempts certain goods from tariffs. A potential plaintiff might argue this framework does not provide a uniform “surcharge” in the words of Section 122. The Section 122 tariffs apply to goods from all countries,[13] including those for which the United States has a trade surplus. This might be argued to be a “surcharge” in excess of what is necessary. Section 122 does allow, but does not seem to require, the President to exempt countries from tariffs if they have large and persistent trade surpluses.[14] Conclusion. To conclude, the Section 122 tariffs are novel, as were the tariffs under IEEPA. However, unlike the IEEPA tariffs, a potential plaintiff will have to go deeper than saying the statute does not permit tariffs. Section 122 explicitly permits tariffs. The CIT, CAFC, and Supreme Court discussion of Section 122 in the IEEPA litigation suggest that Section 122 is an avenue for President Trump to impose global tariffs to address the U.S. trade deficit. Whether that authority is lawfully exercised remains to be seen. [1] See Congressional Research Services, Congressional and Presidential Authority to Impose Import Tariffs, at 16 (February 27, 2025), available at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48435/R48435.1.pdf [2] Executive Order No. 14257, Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,041, (April 2, 2025). [3] 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a). [4] Presidential Proclamation, Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems, (February 20, 2026), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-to-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems/. [5] V.O.S. Selections v. United States, Slip Op 25-66, at 24 (May 29, 2025). [6] Id. at 34. [7] Id. at 35. [8] E.g. V.O.S. v. United States, Slip Op. in case 25-1812, at 27 (citing Section 122 among statutes “where Congress has affirmatively granted such [tariff] power and included clear limits on that power.”). [9] E.g. Learning Resources v. Trump, Slip Op. in 24-1287 (Roberts at Fn 4). [10] See Learning Resources v. Trump, Slip Op. in 24-1287 (Kavanaugh Dissenting at 7). [11] See Learning Resources v. Trump, Slip Op. in 24-1287 (Kavanaugh Dissenting at 62). [12] Section 122 does not actually use the term “trade deficit” with respect to a condition under which global tariffs are authorized. See 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a). Instead, it uses the term “balance of payments” deficit. The CIT reasoned that since trade deficits are one type of balance of payment deficit, that Section 122 would allow global tariffs to address a trade deficit. See V.O.S. v. United States, Slip Op. 25-66 at 34-35.
February 23, 2026
by Dave Townsend
International Trade
Where things Stand After a Monumental Day on Tariffs
February 20, 2026 started off with arguably the most economically significant Supreme Court ruling in living memory when the Court struck down the White House's use of IEEPA authority for tariffs representing roughly half of collected tariff revenue over the last year. The day ended with executive orders from an undeterred White House laying out a course for its continued tariffs strategy. What remains most uncertain is the question of refunds for IEEPA tariffs paid. The Administration's Pathway Forward Reuters reported a quote from Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent that summarizes the Administration's plans well enough: The Supreme Court has taken away the President's leverage, but in a way, they have made the leverage that he has more draconian because they agreed he does have the right to a full embargo. . . We will get back to the same tariff level for the countries. It will just be in a less direct and slightly more convoluted manner. Later in the day, in two different executive actions (here and here), the White House responded to the Supreme Court's decision by announcing specific actions: Immediate 10% tariff replacing in part the IEEPA tariffs: rescinding prior executive orders implementing the tariffs based on IEEPA but using Section 122 authority to enact a temporary 10% import duty for 150 days on most imported goods, with specific exemptions for items otherwise covered or in relation to certain trade partners. (Note: as we are writing this, President Trump reportedly announced that the 10% will immediately be increased to 15% on most goods.) Continuing the De Minimis Exemption. Although IEEPA authority had also been used to remove the de minimis exemption for low-value shipments, the suspension of de minimis continues under IEEPA. New 301 Investigations to Come. The Administration directs the United States Trade Representative to launch unspecified Section 301 investigations into unreasonable or discriminatory foreign trade practices that restrict American commerce. It appears that Section 122 tariffs will act as a bridge between today and when the 301 tariffs can be implemented. The timeline for the new 301 tariffs is unclear, but there is a 150-day limit on the Section 122 tariffs. This could, in short, create a temporary situation where the effective tariff rate dips for several months or even most of 2026 while the 301 tariffs are completed. We also expect new 232 duties and perhaps other (as-of-today) unknown duties that will be imposed to bridge the gap. Refunds Dorsey's client update on the Supreme Court's decision explains the (hopefully temporary) uncertainty regarding a pathway to refunds. The Court’s majority opinion vindicates the plaintiffs in these cases substantively, but there remains ambiguity whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) will stop collecting the IEEPA tariffs before the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) reconsiders its grant of a nationwide injunction. It is also uncertain whether CBP will issue tariff refunds to importers who have not filed their own tariff lawsuits in the CIT to challenge these tariff actions. All eyes will turn to the lower court proceedings, the Trump Administration, and CBP to see how they interpret the scope and impact of the Court’s judgment. On the assumption that importers will ultimately be able to obtain refunds of IEEPA tariffs paid, we will be providing updated advice and strategies as things develop with the CIT and CBP. For some, the pathway may be more expensive and time consuming than makes sense to pursue. In the short term, companies should be gathering data and documentation regarding tariffs paid so that they are in a strong position to make a refund claim. Follow us for more law and policy updates.
February 21, 2026
by Troy M. Keller and Dave Townsend
International Trade
Beyond the Court: Congress and the Future of Emergency Tariffs
President Trump is imposing new tariffs effective on Tuesday, February 24, under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 122”). The Section 122 tariffs replace the tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), and that the Supreme Court on Friday found unlawful. Does a solid legal footing exist for the Section 122 tariffs? Given the amount of money at issue for U.S. businesses, it is not hard to imagine a new wave of litigation attacking Section 122, and again seeking refunds of Section 122 duties collected. Section 122 is a blank slate. President Trump is the first president to impose tariffs under Section 122, and indeed the first president to take any action under Section 122 according to the Congressional Research Service.[1] No court opinions thus exist that have examined executive action under Section 122. As discussed below, however, the court opinions relating to the IEEPA tariffs indicate that trade deficits are a valid basis for temporary tariffs under Section 122. Whether Section 122 will survive closer scrutiny is, ultimately, impossible to predict given the lack of any precedent or past practice as to Section 122’s scope. Basis for New Section 122 Tariffs. The new Section 122 tariffs and the prior IEEPA tariffs identified longstanding, persistent, and large trade deficits as justifying action. In particular, President Trump issued an executive order under IEEPA to address the longstanding U.S. trade deficit, and to authorize the global reciprocal tariffs.[2] Section 122 allows the imposition of tariffs “to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payment deficits” or to “prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets.”[3] In issuing his proclamation on Friday evening imposing Section 122 tariffs, President Trump cited the longstanding and persistent deficit as justifying the action. Thus, “[r]estricting imports through the surcharge imposed in this proclamation is required to address the fundamental international payments problems within the meaning of section 122 that I have found to exist.”[4] Section 122 Discussion in IEEPA Litigation. In the IEEPA litigation, the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) relied heavily on Section 122 to find that the IEEPA tariffs were unlawful. The CIT found that Section 122 “removes the President’s power to impose remedies in response to balance-of-payments deficits, and specifically trade deficits” from IEEPA’s scope of authority.[5] Section 122 is a “non-emergency statute with greater limitations”[6] compared to IEEPA. The CIT, accordingly, said that Section 122 effectively displaced any tariff authority that might be read into IEEPA, at least with respect to trade imbalances. “Trade deficits…can be directly impacted by mechanisms such as import quotas and tariffs, as authorized by Section 122.”[7] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) affirmed the CIT judgment, and also used Section 122 as context for interpreting IEEPA. The CAFC majority opinions cited Section 122 for the proposition that Congress delineated tariff authority carefully, and subject to procedural and durational limits.[8] The majority opinions of the Supreme Court said nothing particularly about Section 122, except to say that numerous U.S. trade statutes place limits on the duration, amount, and scope of tariffs.[9] While the Supreme Court majority opinions did not reference Section 122 at all, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent did. He cited Section 122, along with other statutes, as providing “expansive” power to the President to impose tariffs.[10] Justice Kavanaugh also cited Section 122 to diminish the importance of the Supreme Court’s IEEPA decision: “with respect to tariffs in particular, the Court’s decision might not prevent Presidents from imposing most if not all of these same sorts of tariffs under other statutory authorities.”[11] Thus, from Justice Kavanaugh’s perspective, Section 122’s broad authority created an alternative to IEEPA that could be used to implement global tariffs. Whether Section 122 is Vulnerable to Lawsuit. All of the above is to say that IEEPA litigation suggests Section 122 is a basis to impose global tariffs to remedy trade deficits.[12] Not a lot more can be said than this, as of today. Any reviewing court of Section 122 tariffs would have to confront a dearth of authority on Section 122. There is no existing Section 122 practice, nor are there any cases directly reviewing executive action under Section 122. A reviewing court presumably would have to afford the President at least some discretion in determining the circumstances under which Section 122 is appropriately used. President Trump’s Section 122 proclamation cites to findings of the executive branch as to the scope, severity, and impact of trade deficits. It is unlikely that a reviewing court would meaningfully subject those findings to judicial review. President Trump’s Section 122 proclamation exempts certain goods from tariffs. A potential plaintiff might argue this framework does not provide a uniform “surcharge” in the words of Section 122. The Section 122 tariffs apply to goods from all countries,[13] including those for which the United States has a trade surplus. This might be argued to be a “surcharge” in excess of what is necessary. Section 122 does allow, but does not seem to require, the President to exempt countries from tariffs if they have large and persistent trade surpluses.[14] Conclusion. To conclude, the Section 122 tariffs are novel, as were the tariffs under IEEPA. However, unlike the IEEPA tariffs, a potential plaintiff will have to go deeper than saying the statute does not permit tariffs. Section 122 explicitly permits tariffs. The CIT, CAFC, and Supreme Court discussion of Section 122 in the IEEPA litigation suggest that Section 122 is an avenue for President Trump to impose global tariffs to address the U.S. trade deficit. Whether that authority is lawfully exercised remains to be seen.
February 19, 2026
by Samuel Flitton
International Trade
Supreme Court, IEEPA and Where things Stand
Way back on January 9, I logged into a SCOTUSblog chat group to hear that excellent team live-blog the announcement and delivery of Supreme Court opinions for the day. From the comments of other visitors, I wasn't the only one joining to see if a decision on tariffs was forthcoming. Not by a long shot. Journalists, trade professionals, executives, and others were waiting breathlessly for the news. But the news turned out to be no news. An opinion on the IEEPA case, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, would not be delivered that day. A similar experience was repeated on January 14 and January 20. Still no decision. The next Supreme Court opinion release date won't be until later in February. So it looks like a few more weeks of waiting, at a minimum. Why were Supreme Court tourists like me so anxious about this decision that they couldn't wait the additional 15–30 minutes it would take for the broader media to digest the news and put out a headline? I don't know. I knew I would be speaking with clients immediately after the release. Getting a head start on the actual opinion—and seeing the initial reaction from the SCOTUSblog team—I felt would give me better perspective than distilled journalism. Plus, I just wanted to know as soon as possible! But the waiting, and the speculation, continues. A popular line of thinking is that the timing now suggests the Court is in no hurry because they are going to uphold IEEPA and the status quo. Any truth to that? Probably not. This article takes a deep dive into the question. The consensus view seems to be that it's impossible to know what the passage of time means in this case. All that can be taken from the delay (if it can be called that) is that the case is complicated. That makes sense. Another comment in the article is that the Court may not be anxious because of the White House's commentary that it will move to other tariff authorities if necessary, i.e., taking the pressure of the Court to act quickly. This is also good for businesses to keep in mind. While other authorities aren't as flexible as IEEPA, there are a number of options the White House has to implement tariffs without going to Congress for additional authority. I like this summary table Dorsey's trade team put together: Some of these (like Section 301 and 232) are more or less tried and true at this point. Others, like Section 338 less so. Altogether, it means this case is more about the tariffs paid over the past year than the future and whether importers can anticipate a return of some or all the IEEPA based tariffs. More to come on that front. Follow us for more law and policy updates.
January 26, 2026
by Troy M. Keller